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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
In the Interest of:
:
MICHAEL GENE TANNER, JR.,
(8/18/59)

:

A Minor.

:

Case No.
14174

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by the Utah Department of Social
Services, Division of Family Services, from the order requiring
said Division to provide orthodonture services to the abovenamed Juvenile.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was ordered to provide such orthodonture
services to Michael Gene Tanner, Jr., as are required to correct
his dental condition, by the Second District Juvenile Court, in

and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Regnal
W. Garff, Jr., presiding*
On February 7, 1975, the matter was brought before the
Court on an affidavit for order to show cause and on June 2, 1975,
the court entered its judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant asks that the judgment of the Juvenile Court
be set aside.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent is a minor whose mother is deceased and the
whereabouts of his father are unknown. He was placed in the guardianship of the State Division of Family Services by legal order
of the Juvenile Court dated June 26, 1967 after the court had
made a finding, essentially, that the parents had abandoned the
child and had also failed to obtain proper and necessary medical
care for the child.

On July 30, 1971, upon the motion of the

State Division of Family Services, that agency was relieved of
guardianship, and guardianship was placed with Mr. and Mrs. Melvin Edwards, who had been the long-term foster parents for the
child under the State's Foster Care Program.

The State Division

of Family Services was ordered to continue to pay for the support,
maintenance and other necessary care for the child.
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At a subse-

quent hearing on July 25, 1973, in the petition for renewal of
custody filed by a representative of the State Division of Family
Services, Lois M. Pollard, the court entered a further order in
the matter placing custody of the child with Mr, and Mrs. Melvin
Edwards, and guardianship was vested again in the State Division
of Family Services, with that agency ordered to pay for the support and maintenance of the child and other necessary care.
Respondent, presently, has dental difficulties that may
require orthodonture work for their correction.

On July 27, 1973,

the Juvenile Court appointed David S. Dolowitz to represent the
respondent to attempt to secure orthodonture work to correct his
dental condition.

The said attorney, on behalf of respondent,

entered into a series of negotiations with the agents and employees
of the Division of Family Services to secure orthodonture

services

that were needed to correct the dental condition of the juvenile,
but he was unable to secure the necessary treatment for respondent.
The Division of Family Services of the Utah State Department of
Social Services refused to provide orthodonture services to the
respondent on grounds that respondent did not meet the minimum
standards developed for orthodontia treatment, under its limited
funded dental program.

Respondent, subsequently, through his

attorney, moved for an order to show cause and on June 2, 1975,
the Second District Juvenile Court for Salt Lake County, State of

Utah, the Honorable Regnal W. Garff, Jr., presiding, after
considering the testimony of the witnesses and the records, files,
papers, and memoranda of law in the foregoing matter, and the
Court having entered its findings of fact and conclusions of
law, ordered the Division of Family Services of the Utah State..
Department of Social Services to provide orthodonture services
to the respondent, Michael Gene Tanner, Jr.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUVENILE COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER
THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL-SERVICES TO PROVIDE ORTHODENTURE SERVICES TO THE
RESPONDENT.
The Juvenile Court in its conclusions of law in this
case quotes from Utah's statutory definition of guardianship to
show that the guardian has "among other things, the authority
to consent to marriage, to enlistment in the armed forces, and
to consent to major medical, surgical or psychiatric treatment."
§ 55-10-64(9)

Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended 1965.

The Court

then goes on to say:
"Under this provision, the guardian
has the authority and the obligation to
consent to major medical and surgical
procedures, which the Court concludes this
type of orthodontic treatment to be."
(emphasis supplied).
Making the authority to consent to surgery syonomous
with the obligation to consent is not warranted here, either by

the intent of the statute or by the clear meaning of the words.
And further more, even if the Court were correct in identifying
an obligation to consent, that is not identical with an obligation to pay for such care.
"It is ordinarily for the parent in
the first instance to decide, however,
what is actually necessary for the protection and preservation of the life and
health of his child, so long as he acts
as a reasonable and ordinarily prudent
parent would act in a like situation."
(59 Am Jur. 2d, Parent and Child, § 15,
Medical Care, at 98.)
Under Utah Code Annotated, Section 55-15a-3, the
Department of Social Services is authorized to develop standards
and administer policies relating to eligibility for medical
assistance.

The Department may limit the medical assistance

furnished an applicant to particular types of care or services
to payment of part or all costs of care medically determined to
be mecessary.

Section 55-15a-3 also provides:
"The Department shall develop policy
for the payment of medical claims for
indigent persons under unusual or extenuating circumstances and consult community
health representatives in developing medical
assistance policy and in establishing an
appropriate definition of 'medically needy'."

The Department has done this through its various
Divisions and their respective programs.

In this particular

case the issue is whether the Division of Family Services can
be compelled to provide a particular service when the child in

question has been found to be ineligible for that particular
service according to the standards usually applied for determining eligibility for the service.
In Rickman v. Rickman, 96 S. 2d 574, 265 Ala. 371
(1957) the court affirmed a decree which modified a prior
divorce decree by requiring the father "...to pay the expenses
of necessary orthodonture treatment for his minor child,..."
(266 Ala. at page 376, 96 So. 2d at page 677.)

There is, however,

authority for the proposition that a parent must support his
child reasonably depending on his financial resources and other
demands on his funds.
37 (1953).

(Cowen v. Cowen, 65 So. 2d 196, 259 Ala.

The distinction between Rickman and this case is

that in Rickman, on the appeal, the father apparently did not
make objection to paying directly to the orthodontist.

Here the

Division of Family Services strenuously objects to providing
orthodontic services on grounds that respondant does not meet
the eligibility standards of its limited funded dental program.
The Colorado Supreme Court in Kearney v. Blue, 301
P.2d 515 (1956), in acting on a petition in dependency stated
"the juvenile court, being a creature of statutory provision,
is confined to the mandates of the statute creating it and
defining its operation."

The Utah Supreme Court has likewise

recognized the basic principle that the Juvenile Court is of
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legislative creation and may therefore exercise only the powers
given it by that body.

(State of Utah in the Interest of

Keeran v. DeValmont, 27 Utah 2d 347, 496 P.2d 265). Utah Code
Annotated, Section 55-10-71 gives the Board of Juvenile Court
judges the authority to formulate uniform rules and forms
governing practice and procedure, consistent with the provisions
of that act and any rules that may be promulgated by the Supreme
Court for the Juvenile Court.

Subsection (L:Q further provides

that "the powers to contract and expend funds shall be subject
to budgetary control and procedures as provided by law. "
The Utah Legislature has explicitly recognized the
necessity for the Division of Family Services', to maintain exclusive control over the expenditure of funds appropriated to
it for its various programs.

The 1975 Appropriation Act, con-

tains the following provision in Paragraph 161, the item which
makes an appropriation to the Division of Family Services:
"It is the intent of the Legislature
that funds appropriated to the Division
of Family Services may not be expended
for the purpose of support or other expense for a child placed in any institution, facility, home, school, or other
setting or program, which is not licensed,
regulated, or otherwise approved by the
Division of Family Services pursuant to
its regulations and policies." (Laws of
Utah, 1975, Chapter 213, Item 161, enacted
Feb. 28, 1975).
The Division must take the position that the expenditure of funds for the contemplated orthodic work would be for a

program not approved by the Division and therefore not permissible under the cited appropriation.

Appellant therefore,

submits that if the Juvenile Court does have the authority to
order the Division of Family Services to provide orthodonture
services to qualified applicants, then the Juvenile Courts
authority must be limited to depend on the Department's
financial resources and other demands on its funds.

Respondents

contention that the state, as guardian, must provide for its
ward any orthodonture services needed, without regard to financial
resources available and other demands on its funds, must therefore, be dismissed as being without merit.
Appellant agrees with respondent that the state has a
contractual obligation with the federal government

under 45

C.F.R. § 205, 146, as amended to provide early and periodic
screening, diagnosis and treatment of children under Title XIX
of the Social Security Act, and to assure that each child receives
proper care in its Foster Care Program.

Appellant

submits,

however, that the State also has a contractual responsibility
with the Federal Government, as noted in Utah Code Annotated,
Section 55-15a~14, "to comply with all requirements of the Social
Security Act and all orders, rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder when required as a condition of participation in
benefits under the Social Security Act."

Further it has a con-

tractual responsibility, under 45 C.R.F. Section 250.18 to:

"(a) provide that the medical assistance
unit of the single state agency will establish
and implement a statewide surveillance and
utilization control program that safeguards
against unnecessary or inappropriate utilization of care and services available under the
plan, and excess payments, and that assesses
the quality of such services..."
Appellant further submits that under this contractual
relationship with the federal government, the "single state
agency" requirement under 45 C.F.R. §220.2, which specifies that
there must be a single organizational unit, within the single
state agency, at the state level and also at the local level to
provide or supervise all services to families with children included in the State Plan for Title IV, parts A and B, was
implemented to protect the state in its accountability for use
of its federal grant in accordance with the conditions of the
grant.

Thus, the authority and responsibility of the single

state agency must not be impaired by being subject to external
control of expenditures.
It is, therefore, essential that any court review of
an agency decision be limited to a determination as to whether
the action of the agency was unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious.
The jurisdiction of the juvenile court must be limited
to remanding the matter to the state agency for a redetermination
of the issues by the state agency in accordance with the court's
analysis of any legal provisions and its opinion as to any failure

to observe the essential requirements for a fair hearing.

In

dealing with assistance and services, Utah Code Annotated,
Sections 55-15a-25 and 55-15b-18 allow an applicant or recipient
a right to appeal to the Department of Social Services and such
person is entitled to reasonable notice and a hearing.

The

respondent herein has not exhausted all administrative remedies
available to him, and for that reason should not be allowed to
obtain services through the Juvenile Court.
In a recent case, Winifred K. Pazdera v. Dept. of
Health and Social Services, Wisconsin Circuit Court, Dane County,
(case No. 139-372, Memorandum Decision dated February 4, 1974,
reported in Poverty Law Reporter, §18, 871, the court held that
the provisions in the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social
Services handbook for dentists that required prior authorization
by the Department's dental consultant as a condition precedent
to a dentist who provided orthodonture services securing payment
under the medical assistance program administered under Section
49.45, Wis. Stats., were a reasonable and valid regulation
authorized by Section 49.45(2) (a). The medical assistance
program was federally funded under Title XIX of the Social
Security Act and 42 U.S.C. §1396 (a) (30) specified that the state
plan should provide procedures that might be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of the authorized services.
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Therefore, the juvenile court should have denied
respondent's petition for order to show cause and required
respondent to exhaust all administrative remedies.

To allow

the juvenile court the authority to order the Division of
Family Services of the Department of Social Services to provide
orthodonture services to respondent would not only be administratively and economically unfeasible but could also jeopardize the
Department of Social Services from further receiving federal
funds, by failing to comply with federal requirements.

A R G U M E N T
POINT

II

THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE SALZMAN
INDEX USED IN DETERMINING APPLICANT ELIGIBILITY UNDER
THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICE"S TITLE XIX ORTHODONTIC
PROGRAM TO BE INTRODUCED.
The Department of Social Services has a contract with
Delta Dental Plan, a Utah Non-Profit Corporation composed of
members duly licensed by the State of Utah to practice Dentistry
in the state, to provide fiscal agent services and treatment
utilization review services for dental care under the state's
Title XIX dental program.

Utah Code Annotated, § 55~15a-7,

allows for the Department of Social Services through the office
of Assistance Payments to contract with other public or private
agencies to provide medical services in connection with the
programs of the Department.

Further, Title XIX, of the Social

Security Act, 79 Stat. 343, 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1396 et seq. ,

requires that dental care provided under a state plan to receive financial participation from the federal government must
be provided in a manner to assure prudent administration and
high quality care.
Respondent objected to admitting the Salzman Index
as being irrelevant evidence; he argues that it is not the
state's Title XIX program on which he is basing his action but,
rather on the Division of Family Service's fidciary responsibility as the guardian of the child to meet the needs of the
child under its foster care program, Title IV-A, Section 606 D
of the Social Security Act.

Respondent would have this court

believe that the Juvenile Court has the authority to order the
Division of Family Services to provide orthodonture services
to a child without some rational, non-arbitrary, non-capricious
method of determinging eligibility.
Rule 1 of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines
"relevant evidence" as meaning evidence having any tendency in
reason to prove or disprove the existence of any material fact.
And the contract states that Delta Plan shall provide utilization review services for the Department as follows:
"(2) to approve treatment for those
patients who have been qualified by the
Dental Section of the Division of Health
or such other person or persons as Delta
may designate with concurrence of the
state agency. Such eligibility will be
determined by use of the Salzman Index
in order that an impartial method of
qualification for eligibility will be

used. Inasmuch as there are limited
budgetary funds for the dental pro-'.
gram and since it is the intent of
the state agency and Delta to treat
as many children as possible with
the available funds, the Index number
will start at 34 but may be adjusted
downward to include additional children
until approvals have obligated the
available funds."
,'f

The Salzman Index, which is a nationally known orthodontic

Index for the classification of severity of orthodontic

cases, describes first, the procedures to be followed in assessing orthodontic

cases, and secondly, a list of criteria of

instructions on which that assessment is made and an evaluation
sheet.

The-present orthodontic program provided by the state

through the Delta Plan uses the Salzman Index to determine
whether a particular situation is severe enough to warrant expenditure of state funds to correct it.

The Index is rational

and objective in establishing a point scale of severity.

It

has been statistically determined that the funds which have
been allocated by the State for this service would be insufficient if cases with a Salzman Index severity of less than 34
were approved for treatment.
established at 34.

Therefore the cut-off point was

The respondent in this case did not have

a severity of 34 when measured on the Salzman Index. Thus
appellant submits that the Salzman Index as implemented under
the State's Title XIX Program should have been considered as
being revelant in determining whether respondent's needs

dictate orthodontic treatment or whether the Division of Family
Services abused its descretion under its Social Services Program
by refusing to provide orthodontic treatment to respondent.
The Salzman Index criteria, as part of the state's Title XIX
dental program which is used in coordination with the State's
Foster Care Program, is relevant to show that respondent did not
meet eligibility

standards as required by federal regulations

under the state's limited funded dental program.
The Salzman Index is a particularly crucial factor in
this dispute since the state may become subject to charges that
it has denied equal protection of the law to other applicants
for orthodontic work.

This situation will arise if the present

applicant is approved having a Salzman Index score several
points below the cut-off point at which eligibility is determined
for other applicants.

All those who have been screened for the

state's orthodontic program and who have fallen on the Salzman
Scale at a point between where the respondent in the present
case fell and where the state law established the cut-off for
eligibility would have an arguable claim that they had been
denied the equal protection of the law.

The state would be

hard-put to justify the providing of services to a person who
had a lower eligibility on the index while denying them to a
person who had a lower eligibility.

Yet this is precisely what

what would result should the respondent prevail in the present
case.
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Rule 5 of Utah Rules of Evidence allows this court to
set aside the Juvenile Courts judgment on the grounds that the
excluded evidence had a substantial influence in bringing about
a different finding.

Thus, the Juvenile Court's finding and

conclusion of law that respondent was eligible for orthodonic
treatment without reviewing the procedures to be followed in
assessing orthodonture care and the list of criteria of instructions on which that assessment was made and the evaluation sheet
is, without doubt, reversible error.
C O N C L U S I O N

Based on the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the
Juvenile Court had no authority to order the Division of Family
Services of the Utah State Department of Social Services to
provide orthodonture treatment to respondent.

First, the

Juvenile Court should take into consideration other financial
resources available and any demands on funds.

Second, the

Juvenile Court cannot make any administrative decisions regarding applicant eligibility which is the sole responsibility of
the state agency, third, respondent failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies available to him through the Department.
It is also clear that the Juvenile Court erred in not allowing
the Salzman Index, used in determining applicant eligibility
under the Department of Social Services' Title XIX Orthodontic
Program, to be introduced into evidence.

Therefore, the appellant respectfully submits that
the judgment of the Juvenile Court should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
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PAUL M. TINKER
Assistant Attorney General
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